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Abstract
We identify three common cases that lead to
overestimation of adversarial accuracy against
bounded first-order attack methods, which is pop-
ularly used as a proxy for adversarial robustness in
empirical studies. For each case, we propose com-
pensation methods that either address sources of
inaccurate gradient computation, such as numeri-
cal instability near zero and non-differentiability,
or reduce the total number of back-propagations
for iterative attacks by approximating second-
order information. These compensation methods
can be combined with existing attack methods for
a more precise empirical evaluation metric. We
illustrate the impact of these three cases with ex-
amples of practical interest, such as benchmarking
model capacity and regularization techniques for
robustness. Overall, our work shows that overesti-
mated adversarial accuracy that is not indicative
of robustness is prevalent even for convention-
ally trained deep neural networks, and highlights
cautions of using empirical evaluation without
guaranteed bounds.
1. Introduction
Robustness against adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Biggio & Roli, 2018) is becoming an important factor
for designing deep neural networks, resulting in increased
interest in benchmarking architectures (Su et al., 2018) and
regularization techniques (Madry et al., 2017; Jakubovitz &
Giryes, 2018) for robustness. An essential but challenging
methodology for understanding adversarial robustness is
precise evaluation of adversarial robustness. For a bounded
adversarial example (i.e., within an -ball in Lp norm from
an unperturbed input sample x), adversarial robustness boils
down to the existence of a perturbation r (‖r‖p < ) such
that a deep neural network’s predictions on x and x + r
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are different, which is difficult to (dis)prove for a high-
dimensional input sample. Consequently, empirically test-
ing the prediction using r generated by bounded first-order
attack methods such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) and Projected Gradient Descent (Madry
et al., 2017), which are algorithms that generate r efficiently
with few back-propagations, became a popular approach.
Then, accuracy against samples generated by those attack
methods is taken as a proxy for adversarial robustness for
the entire dataset (e.g., test set).
Nevertheless, this approach only yields an upper bound of ro-
bustness; that is, failure of attack methods to find adversarial
examples might not imply true robustness. Notably, gradient
masking (Papernot et al., 2017; Tramr et al., 2017; Athalye
et al., 2018) inflates adversarial accuracy by inducing gradi-
ents used by attack methods to be inaccurate. Therefore, it
is important to understand when failure of attack methods is
not indicative of robustness in order to obtain more precise
metric for empirical evaluation of adversarial robustness.
In this work, we identify three common cases in which
bounded first-order attack methods are unsuccessful due
to superficial reasons that do not indicate robustness: 1)
cross-entropy loss close to zero resulting in inaccurate com-
putation of gradients, 2) gradient shattering (Athalye et al.,
2018) induced by non-differentiable activation and pooling
operations, and 3) certain training conditions inducing deep
neural networks to be less amenable to first-order approxi-
mation, increasing the number of iterations for iterative at-
tacks to successfully find adversarial examples. We observe
these phenomena are prevalent in various conventionally
trained deep neural networks across different architectures
and datasets, not only confined to specific defenses inten-
tionally designed to cause gradient masking. For each case,
we propose compensation methods to address the cause
(Section 3).
We demonstrate the impact of these phenomena using case
studies on model capacity and regularization techniques
(Section 4). We further analyze transferability of compen-
sation methods for black-box scenarios (Section 5), and
whether these phenomena can explain the gap between em-
pirical adversarial accuracy and verified lower bounds of
robustness (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Tjeng et al., 2019) (Sec-
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tion 6). We conclude this paper by linking our finding back
to related work (Section 7), and with a short remark on
future work (Section 8).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations and definitions
Throughout this paper, we use x to denote an unperturbed
(clean) input and f(·) to represent a neural network. Also,
we denote output pre-softmax logits of a neural network
given x as z = f(x). We only consider the classification
task, and use cross-entropy loss for training and generating
adversarial samples. Naturally, the predicted label is y =
argmax
i
zi where zi represents the value of ith logit. Given
logits z and the ground truth label t, we express the loss as
l(z, t). Gradients of the loss with respect to x are denoted
as g := ∂l(z,t)∂x =
∂l(f(x),t)
∂x .
We consider adversarial robustness within an -ball defined
for Lp norm around an input sample x that is correctly
predicted by a neural network f . That is, if there exists a
perturbation r such that ‖r‖p <  and f(x+ r) 6= f(x), we
claim that f is not robust for x.
2.2. Experimental setup
Dataset We use CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), SVHN
(Netzer et al., 2011), and TinyImageNet (a down-sampled
dataset from Russakovsky et al. (2015)) to analyze and
benchmark adversarial accuracy. The images are normal-
ized to the range [0, 1] for both training and testing, and
further pre-processing includes random crop and flips dur-
ing training. We randomly split 10% of training samples
for validation purpose. For Section 6, we additionally use
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and follow pre-processing of
Wong & Kolter (2017) for MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Neural network architectures We examine various design
choices, including different model capacity, usage of batch
normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015), and residual con-
nections (He et al., 2016). For CIFAR-10 and SVHN, we
consider a Simple model with 4 convolutional layers and 2
fully connected layers, a Simple-BN model that has a batch
normalization layer following each convolutional layer in
a Simple model, and a WideResNet (WRN) (Zagoruyko &
Komodakis, 2016) with depth of 28 layers. For TinyIma-
geNet, we use a VGG-11 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014)
with and without batch normalization, and a WRN with
depth of 50 layers. Details of architectures and their training
hyperparameters are described in Appendix A.
Adversarial attack methods We examine bounded first-
order attack methods that are popularly used to study ad-
versarial robustness for L2 and L∞ norms, for their un-
targeted adversarial examples, primarily under full white-
box setting. In particular, we consider Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), Random-FGSM
(R-FGSM) (Tramr et al., 2017), and Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017). FGSM computes a per-
turbation r as r =  · sign(g) for L∞ norm using a single
back-propagation to obtain g. R-FGSM modifies FGSM by
adding a random perturbation before computing gradients.
PGD uses iterative update to compute a perturbation after
random initialization, and each iteration evaluates gradients
as in FGSM. For L2 norm, sign is replaced with dividing
by ‖g‖2 to produce a unit vector.
Implementation1 All experiments are implemented with
PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). We use AdverTorch (Ding
et al., 2019) as a framework to implement attack methods.
3. Analysis on failure modes of attacks
In this section, we analyze when bounded first-order attack
methods fail to find adversarial examples, and identify three
cases in which such failure does not indicate robustness. We
provide compensation methods for each case to improve the
evaluation metric.
3.1. Zero loss
First-order attack methods use gradients to compute the
perturbation direction. However, when the value of loss
function becomes zero, gradients are naturally zero and do
not provide meaningful information about the perturbation
direction. Similar phenomenon occurs when the value of
loss function is not exactly zero, but very small so that lim-
ited numerical precision and stability contaminate gradients
to be no longer useful. Here we analyze this (near) zero loss
phenomenon and propose simple methods to compensate
for this phenomenon.
Analysis Cross-entropy loss gets small when pre-softmax
logits z have large “margin”, the gap between logits cor-
responding to the most likely and the second most likely
labels, and often becomes zero due to limited numerical
precision. However, logit margins can be simply inflated
by weight matrices with large values, for instance when no
regularization that can penalize large weights is applied. To
illustrate, if a matrix W for a linear equation u = Wv gets
multiplied by a constant c > 1, the difference between ith
and jth element of u will also be inflated by c. Taking ex-
ponential on z with large margin to compute loss can easily
result in near zero loss.
From an experiment using a Simple model trained with-
out explicit regularization on CIFAR-10, we also observe
a symptom of gradient masking, specifically a black-box
1The source code for this paper is available at https://
github.com/kyungmi-lee/eval-adv-robustness.
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Table 1. Accuracy of neural networks against first-order attack methods in the order of FGSM/R-FGSM/PGD for  = 4
255
in L∞ norm.
We apply compensation methods for zero loss and innate non-differentiability discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. As compensation
methods are applied in cascading manner (i.e., samples on which baseline attacks fail are subjected to compensation methods), we set the
number of random starts for baseline R-FGSM and PGD to be same as the total number of evaluations compensation methods use for fair
comparison. All models are trained without explicit regularization on the specified dataset.
Dataset Architecture Accuracy (%)
Clean Attack Baseline Zero loss Non-differentiability Both
CIFAR-10
Simple 84.75 19.50 / 29.81 / 2.55 10.79 / 29.11 / 1.68 18.41 / 29.17 / 2.54 8.74 / 28.31 / 1.67
Simple-BN 87.09 28.66 / 28.39 / 6.26 9.93 / 19.03 / 0.10 26.92 / 28.05 / 6.11 6.89 / 17.93 / 0.07
WRN 28 91.65 21.90 / 20.79 / 0.02 11.34 / 13.46 / 0 15.87 / 19.76 / 0.02 5.94 / 11.25 / 0
SVHN Simple-BN 94.29 28.60 / 43.36 / 2.80 23.81 / 42.21 / 2.59 24.35 / 42.60 / 2.60 19.10 / 41.31 / 2.38WRN 28 95.42 49.74 / 58.22 / 4.06 45.46 / 57.04 / 3.73 39.69 / 56.70 / 3.79 34.30 / 55.05 / 3.69
TinyImageNet
VGG 11 50.32 11.32 / 20.16 / 7.94 7.44 / 16.56 / 4.10 11.30 / 20.62 / 7.98 7.44 / 16.86 / 4.22
VGG-BN 11 50.72 4.16 / 11.68 / 0.64 3.22 / 10.70 / 0.48 3.82 / 11.80 / 0.68 3.06 / 11.00 / 0.48
WRN 50 57.24 19.78 / 23.40 / 2.02 3.36 / 9.86 / 0.40 18.24 / 23.48 / 1.58 2.88 / 10.02 / 0.36
attack being stronger than a white-box attack (Athalye et al.,
2018) (full detail in Appendix B.1). While this implies that
adversarial accuracy of the model could have been overesti-
mated, we also find many samples on which an attack (e.g.,
FGSM) fails have (near) zero loss (< 10−8) induced by
large logit margin. Overall, we cannot conclude that failure
of attacks to find adversarial examples in case of (near) zero
loss is indicative of robustness.
Compensation A straightforward way to account for this
(near) zero loss phenomenon is to ensure that the value of
loss is sufficiently large so that gradients can be computed
accurately. First, we consider rescaling pre-softmax logits
z by dividing with a fixed constant T ; that is, we compute
gradients for loss on rescaled logits, l( f(x)T , t) where t is
ground truth labels. When T > 1, absolute value of logits
decrease, leading to larger cross-entropy loss. Alternatively,
we consider changing t from ground truth labels to other
classes when computing loss, which essentially gives same
expression as targeted attacks. Since loss with respect to
ground truth labels is small, changing target class will in-
crease loss. Note that still our interest is to find untargeted
adversarial examples although we change loss function to
be targeted to ensure large value. After increasing the value
of loss using either approach, we apply first-order attack
methods as usual.
We find that changing target labels to be the second most
likely classes generally gives the best compensation method
for white-box attacks compared to rescaling logits and other
possible target labels (e.g. randomly chosen classes or the
least likely classes), increasing success rate of attack meth-
ods up to 11% for FGSM and 4.5% for PGD ( = 8255 ,
L∞) for the above-mentioned Simple model. Quantitative
comparison of these methods is presented in Appendix B.1.
Impact We benchmark how this phenomenon affects evalu-
ation against first-order attack methods by comparing adver-
sarial accuracy against baseline attacks (i.e., vanilla FGSM,
R-FGSM, and PGD) and attacks with the compensation
method using the second most likely classes as targets for
computing loss. We apply the compensation method to
samples on which baseline attacks fail and report resulting
accuracy (Table 1, Column ‘Zero loss’).
Gradient masking induced by zero loss was previously ob-
served by Carlini & Wagner (2017) for their analysis of
defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b), which used
temperature softmax (same as rescaling logits) during the
distillation step. However, we find that this phenomenon is
not confined to specific defenses that deliberately caused gra-
dient masking; we can see prevalence of this phenomenon
among many conventionally trained models as shown in
Table 1.
We can expect that this phenomenon will affect models
trained without explicit regularization that have weight
matrices with large magnitudes more severely compared
to models trained with regularizations that penalize large
weights such as weight decay. For a Simple model trained
on CIFAR-10, we verify that compensating for this phe-
nomenon decreases adversarial accuracy by 4.48% and
0.19% for FGSM and PGD ( = 4255 , L∞) when weight
decay is applied, compared to 8.71% and 0.87% when no
regularization is used.
3.2. Innate non-differentiability
Non-differentiability of functions that are in the computation
graph for back-propagation causes gradient shattering, a
type of gradient masking identified by Athalye et al. (2018).
In this section, we analyze how innate non-differentiability
induced by popularly used Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
and max pooling subtly affects attack methods, and how
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to compensate for this phenomenon using Backward Pass
Differentiable Attack (BPDA) (Athalye et al., 2018).
Analysis A layer using ReLU as an activation function
passes gradients only through non-negative valued neurons,
as negative valued neurons are set to be zero after ReLU.
However, adding perturbations r can “switch” some of neg-
ative valued neurons, which did not contribute to gradients
originally, to take non-negative values (or vice versa) during
forward-propagation. In such cases, gradients are no longer
accurate as the effective neurons contributing to the final
prediction are changed. A similar problem exists for max
pooling when perturbations change the maximum valued
neurons in each pooling window.
We analyze how often this switching happens for ReLU and
max pooling when perturbations are added to inputs. On
a Simple model trained without explicit regularization on
CIFAR-10, we observe that more neurons switch for larger
perturbation size , and the fraction of neurons that switch
can be significant, especially for max pooling (7.73% of
ReLU neurons and 20.60% of max pooling neurons switch
for a FGSM attack with  = 8255 in L∞ norm).
Compensation BPDA provides a method to approximate
gradients for non-differentiable functions, by substituting
such functions with similar but differentiable functions dur-
ing back-propagation. Although BPDA was originally used
to break defenses that relied on non-differentiability, we use
BPDA to smoothly approximate behaviors of ReLU and
max pooling around their non-differentiable points. Substi-
tuting ReLU with softplus and max pooling with Lp norm
pooling with p = 5 can be used as a default setting for
BPDA especially when compensating for both this and the
zero loss phenomena. Detailed comparison of substitute
functions are shown in Appendix B.2.
Impact Similar to the zero loss phenomenon, we bench-
mark how innate non-differentiability affects adversarial
accuracy using softplus and p = 5 or 10 as the compen-
sation method (Table 1, Column ‘Non-differentiability’).
We observe that non-differentiability generally gives sub-
tle difference (∼ 1%) especially for R-FGSM and PGD.
Nevertheless, there are models significantly affected by non-
differentiability, such as a WRN 28 trained on SVHN, which
shows more than 10% difference for FGSM. Also, FGSM
seems to be more affected than other attack methods, which
can be explained by smaller effective step size of R-FGSM
and PGD, since smaller  results in less frequent switching
of neurons. For example, PGD uses small step size (< )
for each iteration, and R-FGSM typically takes a step size
of 2 instead of  due to added random perturbation.
We also report adversarial accuracy when attacks are com-
pensated for both zero loss and non-differentiability (Table
1, Column ‘Both’). Compensating for both phenomena ad-
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Figure 1. (Above) Adversarial accuracy against a PGD attack ( =
0.5, L2, compensated for zero loss and non-differentiability) of
WRN 28 models trained on CIFAR-10 with different regularization
conditions, as a function of the number of iterations the attack
uses. Shown in log-log scale. (Below) Comparison of different
compensation methods (Eigen and BFGS) discussed in Section
3.3 on a WRN 28 trained with excessive weight decay (same as
in the above figure), under the same number of back-propagations
required to find adversarial examples.
ditionally accounts for up to 5% (e.g., WRN 28 models
trained on CIFAR-10 and SVHN evaluated against FGSM)
compared to only compensating for one of them.
3.3. Require more iterations
We observe that certain training conditions increase the
number of iterations required to find adversarial examples
for iterative attack methods, resulting in increased adversar-
ial accuracy when evaluated against attacks using small
fixed number of iterations. We propose to incorporate
second-order information to reduce the total number of back-
propagations when this phenomenon occurs.
Analysis We find that applying weight decay excessively
(increasing strength of weight decay as training progresses)
for a WRN 28 trained on CIFAR-10 improves adversarial ac-
curacy against PGD ( = 0.5, L2, compensated for zero loss
and non-differentiability) using small number of iterations,
but eventually does not manifest in a benefit compared to a
model trained without explicit regularization for large num-
ber of iterations (Figure 1, above). For example, a model
with excessive weight decay is evaluated to have 7.11% of
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adversarial accuracy compared to only 0.12% of a model
with no regularization when PGD uses 5 iterations, but it
ultimately shows less than 0.1% of adversarial accuracy
when the number of iterations is increased to 100. This
observation can be concerning when one uses attacks with a
small number of iterations, which can be typical when eval-
uating complex neural networks where back-propagations
are computationally expensive, to compare different training
conditions and concludes that simply applying weight decay
excessively can provide advantage.
Compensation While using a large number of iterations is
an uncomplicated way to prevent overestimation of adversar-
ial accuracy, we investigate methods to reduce the number
of back-propagations needed and to better understand why
certain conditions require more iterations. A couple of plain
observations are that random initialization of PGD affects
the success of subsequent first-order iterations, which is the
well-known reason for using multiple random starts when
attack methods have stochasticity, and that successful ini-
tialization (from which first-order iterations find adversarial
examples) leads to larger increase of loss and the size of
gradients (in L2 norm) per iteration. Although the obser-
vations themselves can be trivial, they hint that initializing
to a point where gradients change rapidly, thus with high
curvature, might help subsequent first-order iterations to
find adversarial examples easily.
However, exact curvature of loss is second-order informa-
tion that is computationally expensive and numerically un-
stable to obtain. Thus we consider a method that can approx-
imate the principal eigenvector (corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue) of the Hessian, which provides information on
which direction loss changes fastest. We adopt a single step
of power iteration (Eq (1)) and finite difference method (Eq
(2)) of Miyato et al. (2019), which roughly approximates
the principal eigenvector u of Hessian H as:
u← H · d‖H · d‖2 (1)
H · d =
∂l(f(x′),t)
∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x+δd
− ∂l(f(x′),t)∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x
δ
(2)
where d is randomly sampled from N (0, I) and normalized
to be a unit vector. This method uses two additional back-
propagations to compute u, which we use as a direction for
initialization of PGD (PGD + Eigen) instead of a random
vector.
We also examine Quasi-Newton method, specifically BFGS,
which approximates the inverse of the Hessian used to com-
pute Newton direction. To simplify computational overhead,
we only use a single iteration to update the Hessian, and
omit line search and instead use perturbation size  to obtain
initialization (PGD + BFGS). This method also adds two
additional back-propagations.
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Figure 2. Comparison of clean and adversarial accuracy for Simple
models with different relative widths (trained on CIFAR-10). We
present difference of accuracy of these models with respect to ac-
curacy of the model with width 1. Dashed and solid line represent
accuracy against baseline and compensated attacks, respectively.
Impact We test the effectiveness of these two methods on
the above-mentioned WRN 28 trained with excessive weight
decay, by comparing adversarial accuracy against PGD at-
tacks using these methods as initialization, under the same
total number of back-propagations used for both initializa-
tion and first-order iteration (Figure 1, below). We find that
both methods provide stronger attack; for example, adver-
sarial accuracy against PGD + Eigen and PGD + BFGS
are 4.82% and 3.60% compared to 7.11% of baseline PGD
when using only 5 back-propagations (equivalent to 5 itera-
tions for baseline PGD, and 3 first-order iterations for PGD
+ Eigen and PGD + BFGS). Thus, utilizing approximate
second-order information reduces the total number of back-
propagations to achieve similar success rate of attacks when
this phenomenon occurs.
4. Case study
In this section, we investigate how the three phenomena
inducing overestimation of adversarial accuracy affect prac-
tically important cases, such as benchmarking the trade-off
between model capacity and adversarial robustness, and
comparison of regularization techniques.
4.1. Model capacity
4.1.1. TRAINING MODELS WITH DIFFERENT WIDTH
First, we consider comparing adversarial accuracy among
models with the same architecture but with different width
(number of output neurons in each layer). Several studies
postulate that models with larger width provide better ad-
versarial robustness (Madry et al., 2017; Deng et al., 2019),
by showing better adversarial accuracy of those models
against FGSM or PGD. We examine this claim by measur-
ing adversarial accuracy of Simple models with different
relative width trained on CIFAR-10 with fixed weight de-
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Figure 3. Change of clean and adversarial accuracy through it-
erative pruning on an over-parameterized WRN 28 (trained on
CIFAR-10), trained and finetuned without explicit regularization
(above) and with weight decay (below). Dashed and solid lines
represent accuracy against baseline attacks and compensated at-
tacks, respectively. The total number of back-propagations is fixed
to 9.
cay, against both baseline and compensated attacks under
the same number of evaluations (i.e., random starts) and
back-propagations (i.e., gradient computations for either
iterations of PGD or initialization of methods in Sec 3.3)
(Figure 2). We find that although models with larger width
indeed show better adversarial accuracy, their benefit over
smaller models could have been overstated; for example, a
PGD attack ( = 1.0, L2) gives 10.14% difference in adver-
sarial accuracy between the models with width 1 and 16, but
compensating for zero loss and non-differentiability results
in only 0.41% difference. Although for other attacks we ob-
serve less extreme gaps between baseline and compensated
attacks, we generally find that adversarial accuracy of mod-
els with larger width tends to be overestimated especially
due to the zero loss phenomenon.
4.1.2. WEIGHT PRUNING
As another approach to benchmark the trade-off between
model capacity and adversarial robustness, we consider
pruning an over-parameterized model and its effect on ad-
versarial accuracy. We iteratively prune weights of a large
WRN 28 (trained on CIFAR-10; details in Appendix C.2)
along with finetuning (Han et al., 2015), both with and with-
out fixed weight decay, and measure adversarial accuracy
as in Section 4.1.1 (Figure 3). Without weight decay during
training and finetuning, adversarial accuracy against base-
line attacks drops significantly (> 25%) as more weights
are pruned away. However, applying compensation methods
show that adversarial accuracy actually drops less than 1%,
similar to that of clean accuracy. The major source of dis-
crepancy is the zero loss phenomenon, in that the original
dense model’s adversarial accuracy is overestimated due to
this phenomenon and the pruned sparse models in fact rely
less severely on this phenomenon.
On the other hand, adversarial accuracy against baseline
attacks increases by 3.5% through iterative pruning with
weight decay, but compensating results in less than 0.4% of
increase. We find that weight decay used during finetuning,
which adds a large number of epochs (e.g., 10 epochs for
finetuning × 10 pruning iteration→ 100 additional epochs),
can act similar to excessive weight decay discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3. As a result, sparser models show higher adversar-
ial accuracy against baseline PGD, and using initialization
methods of Section 3.3 (e.g., PGD + Eigen) gives a more
accurate evaluation in this scenario.
This example illustrates how compensating for the phenom-
ena discussed in Section 3 can prevent misleading conclu-
sions. For example, for WRN 28 models and L2 PGD
attacks we tested here, pruning does not affect adversar-
ial accuracy significantly. However, without proper com-
pensation, one might conclude that pruning negatively af-
fects adversarial accuracy only observing the case without
weight decay, or that pruning improves adversarial accuracy
while also reducing the model size after experimenting with
weight decay.
4.2. Regularization
We compare popular regularization techniques proposed
for better generalization or robustness, on whether their
adversarial accuracy is affected by the three phenomena
we discussed. We train WRN 28 models with different
regularization techniques on CIFAR-10, and report adver-
sarial accuracy against baseline and compensated attacks
(Table 2; details of hyperparameter in Appendix C.3). We
observe that input gradient regularization (Ross & Doshi-
Velez, 2017) and adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) are
least affected by compensation methods, indicating that their
robustness does not rely on the phenomena discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Adversarial accuracy of other regularization methods,
such as weight decay and spectral normalization (Miyato
et al., 2018), partly seems to be overestimated by those
phenomena although some of them show better adversarial
accuracy even after compensation (e.g., a model trained with
spectral normalization shows 21.64% and 5.25% decrease
in adversarial accuracy for FGSM and PGD, respectively,
when compensation methods are applied). Nevertheless,
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Table 2. Clean and adversarial (FGSM/PGD,  = 4
255
, L∞, total
9 back-propagations for PGD) accuracy (%) of WRN 28 models
trained using different regularization techniques on CIFAR-10. We
compare adversarial accuracy against baseline and compensated
attacks.
Regularization Clean Attack Baseline Compensated
None 91.65 21.90 / 0.02 5.94 / 0
Weight decay 93.64 31.47 / 0.02 20.31 / 0.02
Weight decay excess 91.52 47.83/ 1.85 36.46 / 0.63
Spectral norm1 87.34 31.50 / 7.50 9.86 / 2.25
Orthonormal2 93.47 27.19 / 0.03 13.25 / 0.01
Input gradient3 89.75 24.93 / 12.80 23.18 /12.79
Adversarial training4 82.67 67.62 / 65.58 66.46 / 64.82
1 Sets the largest eigenvalue of each weight matrix to be 1, fol-
lowing Miyato et al. (2018)
2 Penalizes non-orthonormal weight matrices (not full Parseval
training of Cisse et al. (2017)), as used in Lin et al. (2019)
3 Penalizes the gradients of loss w.r.t. inputs (Ross & Doshi-
Velez, 2017)
4 Training on adversarial examples of PGD ( = 8
255
, L∞)
(Madry et al., 2017)
these regularization methods show different behavior for
other model architectures and datasets, and those cases are
reported in Appendix C.3.
5. Transferability of compensated attacks
We focus on a black-box attack scenario in which adver-
sarial examples are crafted using a surrogate model that is
trained on the same dataset as a target model, but without
access to parameters of a target model. We observe that the
three phenomena inflating adversarial accuracy discussed
in Section 3 can also affect evaluations in black-box setting
when a surrogate model suffers from those phenomena. We
also show that compensation methods produce transferable
adversarial examples, partly accounting for overestimated
black-box adversarial accuracy.
We first examine transferability of examples generated using
each compensation method. For the zero loss phenomenon,
we find that rescaling logits can provide examples with
better transferability, especially when we assume attacks
cannot access pre-softmax logits of a target model. Also,
examples generated with initialization methods of Section
3.3 only show limited transferability, resulting in less than
< 1% of difference for black-box adversarial accuracy when
using PGD + Eigen.
To illustrate transferability, we measure average accuracy
against black-box attacks among WRN 28 models trained
on CIFAR-10 using different regularization techniques as
in Secton 4.2, by using one of them as a surrogate and mea-
suring accuracy on others. On average, compensating for
zero loss and non-differentiability gave 11.16% and 2.90%
Table 3. Comparison of lower bounds of robustness obtained with
MILP (Tjeng et al., 2019) and empirical adversarial accuracy
against both baseline and compensated PGD attacks (5 random
starts for both; the total number of back-propagations is 50 for
MNIST and 10 for CIFAR-10). Models are trained to be provably
robust (Wong & Kolter, 2017) in stated -ball for L∞ norm. For
each model, attacks use the same  the model has been trained for
as the maximum perturbation size.
Model Lower bound Adversarial accuracy
Baseline Compensated
MNIST-A,  = 0.4 52.401 54.96 54.09
MNIST-B,  = 0.3 75.812 78.96 77.35
CIFAR-A,  = 2
255
49.802 51.76 51.18
CIFAR-B,  = 8
255
22.402 23.49 22.86
1 Exact robustness obtained with MILP (Tjeng et al., 2019)
2 Values directly taken from Tjeng et al. (2019)
difference when the models with no explicit regularization
and excessive weight decay are used as surrogate models,
respectively, for a PGD attack ( = 0.5, L2, fixed to total 9
back-propagations). When the model with excessive weight
decay is a surrogate, using PGD + Eigen accounted for an
additional 0.88% on average. More results on transferability
is shown in Appendix D.
6. Comparison with verified lower bounds
Recently proposed methods for provably robust adversarial
training (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Sinha et al., 2017; Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018) provide the guaranteed lower bound of
robustness, although computational efficiency and scalabil-
ity are challenging issues. Nevertheless, there is usually a
gap between the guaranteed lower bound and adversarial ac-
curacy that serves as the natural upper bound of robustness.
We investigate whether this gap can be explained by the
three phenomena responsible for overestimated adversarial
accuracy.
We experiment on models from Wong & Kolter (2017) that
are trained to be provably robust, and obtain lower bounds
of those models with the verification approach based on
MILP (Tjeng et al., 2019) that produces tight bounds for
deep neural networks with ReLU activation. Details of
these models are explained in Appendix E. Then, we com-
pare adversarial accuracy against baseline and compensated
PGD (Table 3). We find that the three phenomena at least
partially explain the gap between empirical adversarial ac-
curacy and verified lower bounds; compensation methods
result in 0.58 − 1.61% difference in adversarial accuracy,
and can bring adversarial accuracy within 0.46% of the
lower bound (e.g., CIFAR-B). The major source contribut-
ing to this gap is non-differentiability for models trained on
MNIST, and zero loss for those trained on CIFAR-10.
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7. Related work
Attack methods In this work, we use FGSM, R-FGSM,
and PGD for the analysis on their failure cases. There
are notable modifications to PGD, such as Basic Iterative
Method (Kurakin et al., 2016) that omits random initializa-
tion of PGD or Momentum Iterative Method (Dong et al.,
2017) that updates each iteration using the momentum term.
Our compensation methods are based on these bounded
first-order attacks, and provide more accurate gradient com-
putation (Sec 3.1, 3.2) and efficient initialization for PGD
(Sec 3.3). Although not examined in this work, Jacobian
Saliency Map Attack (Papernot et al., 2016a) provides L0
norm attack method and uses gradients to find each pixel’s
importance. Alternatively, unbounded attack methods find
adversarial examples with minimum perturbation size with
optimization-based approaches (Szegedy et al., 2013; Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017; Chen et al., 2017). For unbounded
attack methods, empirical evaluation typically compares the
average perturbation size instead of measuring adversarial
accuracy.
Gradient masking Papernot et al. (2017) observed that
black-box attacks can break defensive distillation (Papernot
et al., 2016b), which provided robustness against white-box
attacks, and called the phenomenon “gradient masking”.
Furthermore, Carlini & Wagner (2017) analyzed that tem-
perature softmax used in defensive distillation led to large
margin in pre-softmax logits, resulting in zero loss. More
generally, Athalye et al. (2018) found that certain defenses
claiming robustness against white-box attacks relied on ob-
fuscated gradients. Our work is motivated by these previous
studies on gradient masking, and contributes by identifying
how similar phenomena, such as zero loss (Sec 3.1) and
non-differentiability (Sec 3.2), affect evaluation of broad
range of deep neural networks.
Verification methods Another approach to evaluate robust-
ness is verification, which provides guaranteed lower bounds
of robustness using optimization techniques. While verifica-
tion is significantly more difficult than empirically finding
adversarial examples using attack methods, recent work
(Wong & Kolter, 2017; Sinha et al., 2017; Raghunathan
et al., 2018) could reduce computational complexity of veri-
fication by relaxing non-convexities. Moreover, Tjeng et al.
(2019) proposed to use Mixed-Integer Programming to ob-
tain exact robustness for deep neural networks using ReLU
as activation. However, retaining computational efficiency
while keeping bounds tight and scaling to complex datasets
and architectures remain challenging. Our work is orthogo-
nal to verification methods, and can be used to obtain tighter
empirical upper bounds with low computational cost (Sec
6).
Benchmarking robustness There has been increased in-
terest in understanding adversarial robustness for various
design choices, such as architectures (Su et al., 2018; Deng
et al., 2019), activation quantization (Lin et al., 2019) for
hardware efficiency, and regularization techniques for ro-
bustness (Madry et al., 2017; Cisse et al., 2017). These
studies use empirical evaluation against adversarial attacks
for numerical experiments.
8. Conclusion
Overestimated adversarial accuracy has been mainly investi-
gated for defenses that often explicitly capitalized on obfus-
cated gradients (Athalye et al., 2018) or zero loss (Papernot
et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). In this work, we
demonstrate that sources of overestimated adversarial ac-
curacy exist for many conventionally trained deep neural
networks, across different architectures and datasets. The
three common cases are 1) zero loss that induces gradient
computation to be inaccurate due to numerical instability,
2) innate non-differentiability of ReLU and max pooling
that can “switch” when perturbations are added, resulting
in a different set of effective neurons contributing to the
final prediction for back-propagation (to compute gradients)
and forward-propagation (perturbations are tested for effec-
tiveness), and 3) requiring more iterations to successfully
find adversarial examples for models trained with certain
conditions, such as excessive application of weight decay,
thus inflating adversarial accuracy against iterative attacks
with small fixed number of iterations. We analyze conse-
quences of these three cases with experiments on different
model capacity and regularization techniques, by compar-
ing adversarial accuracy before and after compensating for
these three cases. Moreover, we show how these three cases
can influence black-box adversarial accuracy, and partially
account for the gap between empirical adversarial accuracy
and verified lower bounds of robustness.
Nevertheless, the three cases we identified might not be
an exhaustive list responsible for overestimated adversar-
ial accuracy. We still observe a gap between compensated
adversarial accuracy and the exact robustness obtained by
MILP (Tjeng et al., 2019) for MNIST-A in Table 3. This
implies that there might exist other phenomena accounting
for this gap or that better compensation methods exist for
the cases we proposed here. We think future work on inves-
tigating other types of gradient masking and compensation
methods will benefit empirical studies by further sharpening
the metric for adversarial robustness. Additionally, future
work on theoretical analysis of our observations, such as
models with larger width tend to rely more on zero loss (Sec
4.1.1) or excessive weight decay makes a WRN 28 model
less amenable to first-order approximation (Sec 3.3, 4.1.2),
can clarify whether they have fundamental implications or
are artifacts.
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A. Details of experimental setups
A.1. Architectures
Simple and Simple-BN architectures briefly described in Section 2.2 are explained in detail in Table A.1. For WRN 28, we
modify the number of output channels and pooling window size to fit with smaller input dimension of CIFAR-10 and SVHN
compared to ImageNet. For VGG and WRN used for TinyImageNet, we use the architecture defined as in TorchVision, and
only modify final pooling and fully connected layer’s dimension to fit downscaled TinyImageNet (3× 64× 64 with 200
classes).
Table A.1. Description of neural network architectures used in this paper. Convolution layers are specified as (output channel, input
channel, kernel height, kernel width, stride, padding). Maxpool layers are in (kernel height, kernel width, stride, padding), and fully
connected (FC) layers are in (output channel, input channel).
Model Type Description (w: width scaling factor)
Simple
Conv1 : (w × 8, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1)
Conv2 : (w × 8, w × 8, 3, 3, 1, 1)
MaxPool: (2, 2, 2, 0)
Conv3 : (w × 16, w × 8, 3, 3, 1, 1)
Conv4 : (w × 16, w × 16, 3, 3, 1, 1)
MaxPool: (2, 2, 2, 0)
FC1 : (w × 128, w × 16× 8× 8)
FC2 : (10, w × 128)
Simple-BN
Convolution and FC layers are same as in Simple,
but Batch Normalization layer follows each
Convolution layer.
A.2. Training condition
As a default setting, we train for 100 epochs using Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with momentum of 0.9 for CIFAR-10
and SVHN. For Simple-BN and WRN 28, we use starting learning rate of 0.1 and decay it by factor of 10 for every 40 epochs.
For Simple, we start with learning rate of 0.01. Models for TinyImageNet are trained with Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99),
with starting learning rate of 0.001. Learning rate decay is applied in the same manner. Default batch size is 128, unless GPU
memory is insufficient. Different training conditions deviating from the default setting, including specific regularizations,
are described when they are introduced in Appendix C.
A.3. Equations for attack methods
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) for L∞ norm with the perturbation size  can be expressed as:
xadv = x+  · sign(g) = x+  · sign(∂l(f(x), t)
∂x
) (A.1)
Then, Random-FGSM (R-FGSM) modifies FGSM by adding a random perturbation before computing gradients:
x′ = x+

2
· sign(r) (A.2)
xadv = x
′ +

2
· sign(∂l(f(x
′), t)
∂x′
) (A.3)
where r is randomly sampled from normal distribution N (0, I). Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) updates xadv iteratively,
and the equation for step s+ 1 can be expressed as:
x
(0)
adv = x+  · sign(r) (A.4)
x
(s+1)
adv = x
(s)
adv + clip(α · sign(
∂l(f(x
(s)
adv, t)
∂x
(s)
adv
), ) (A.5)
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where r is random initialization vector as in the equation (A.2), and α is a step size. Clip operation ensures the perturbation
to be within the -ball around the sample x. For L2 norm, sign operation is replaced with dividing by the size ‖g‖2 to
obtain a unit vector. That is, for FGSM:
xadv = x+  · g‖g‖2 (A.6)
Other attacks can be similarly modified. Since sign operation no longer exists, we can drop ‘S’ from names of attacks
(e.g., FG(S)M and R-FG(S)M).
B. Additional analysis on failure of attacks
B.1. Zero loss
B.1.1. OMITTED ANALYSIS
First, we train a Simple model (w = 4) without explicit regularization on CIFAR-10, and analyze the average loss and size
of gradients (in L2 norm) (Table B.1). We characterize those statistics for samples on which a FGSM attack ( = 8255 )
succeeds and fails. Observe that samples on which the attack fails have smaller loss and size of gradients induced by large
logit margin.
Table B.1. Characterizing samples on which the white-box attack using FGSM ( = 8
255
) succeeds and fails for the value of loss, size of
gradients, and logit statistics including margin and variance, for a Simple model with width scale factor of 4 trained without explicit
regularization on CIFAR-10.
Attack succeed Attack fail
Loss 0.0643 0.0011
Gradient 2.0686 0.0339
Logit margin 7.20 18.73
Logit variance 73.44 142.19
Furthermore, we observe that a black-box attack on the above-mentioned model is stronger than a white-box attack: when
the model with the same architecture, width, and initialization but trained independently using weight decay regularization
(with hyperparameter 5× 10−4) is used as a surrogate, a black-box FGSM attack ( = 8255 ) on the above-mentioned model
results in 13.22% accuracy (in other words, 86.78% attack success). However, a white box FGSM attack with the same 
results in 14.04% accuracy, higher than that against the black-box attack. This observation indicates that a black-box attack
is stronger than a white-box attack for this model, signaling a possible gradient masking.
Additionally, we visualize how loss changes as a perturbation is added (Fig B.1) on a randomly chosen clean sample x on
which the white-box attack fails but the black-box attack succeeds. This sample has zero cross-entropy loss. We can observe
that moving along the direction of g (while 2 = 0) does not increase loss even when the perturbation size is increased
to 1 = 16255 . However, notice that the black-box attack’s gradients easily increase loss (Fig B.1 (a)). We also visualize
loss when 2 moves along the direction of gradients produced by changing the target label for loss to be the second most
likely class (Fig B.1 (b)). This illustrates how gradients computed from zero loss do not give meaningful perturbation
direction, and why failure of attacks in such case does not indicate robustness (i.e., existence of adversarial examples in
other perturbation directions, such as gradients of the black-box attack).
B.1.2. COMPARISON OF COMPENSATION METHODS
We compare the effectiveness of compensation methods discussed in Section 3.1, by comparing accuracy against compensated
attack methods on a Simple model trained without explicit regularization on CIFAR-10 (Table B.2). Generally, changing the
target label to be the second most likely class (corresponding to the second largest logit) gives the best compensation for this
model.
B.1.3. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODELS
In addition to comparing models trained with and without weight decay for how they are affected by the zero loss
phenomenon, as in Section 3.1, we additionally compare models with larger width or batch normalization (Table B.3). For
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(a) (b)
Figure B.1. Visualization of the value of loss (z-axis) evaluated for points x∗ = x+ 1 · sign(g) + 2 · sign(g′), where g is gradients
of loss with respect to the input sample computed using the target model itself, and g′ is (a) gradients computed from a surrogate model
used for a black-box attack, and (b) gradients computed using the second most likely class as the label for loss instead of the ground truth.
the Simple architecture and CIFAR-10 dataset we investigate here, models with larger width or batch normalization are
affected more severely than a model with smaller width and no batch normalization.
B.2. Innate non-differentiability
Here we present different choices of substitute functions and their effectiveness. First, as a substitute for ReLU, we consider
softplus (α = 2, threshold set to 2), CELU (α = 2), and ELU (α = 1). While softplus and CELU are continuously
differentiable at zero regardless of the hyperparameter α that controls the slope, α for ELU has to be fixed to 1 to ensure
differentiability at zero. Second, if a model uses max pooling, we substitute max pooling with Lp norm pooling. As p→∞,
Lp norm pooling gets closer to max pooling. Thus, sufficiently large but finite p can provide differentiable approximation of
max pooling. Tables B.4 and B.5 show the effectiveness of each choice for a Simple model and a WRN 28 model. Tables B.6
and B.7 compare each choice when combined with zero loss compensation. We observe that using softplus and p = 5, 10
generally gives the most decrease in adversarial accuracy, when compensating for both this and the zero loss phenomena.
However, when only compensating for this phenomenon, other substitute functions often give better compensation.
B.3. Require more iterations
Eigenvector approximation (PGD + Eigen) Miyato et al. (2019) proposed a method to approximate the principle
eigenvector u of the Hessian H for a semi-supervised learning problem. Although their objective function for which they
computed u and H is different from ours, we adopt their general principle to use power iteration and finite difference method
to approximate u of our H = ∇∇xl(f(x), t). Power iteration starts with a randomly sampled vector d, with an assumption
that d has non-zero projection on the principle eigenvector u. Then, d is updated as d← H·d‖H·d‖2 until it converges. Finite
difference method is used to approximate H · d when exact H is hard to obtain; since only the product H · d is necessary,
finite difference method computes the difference between first-order derivatives measured for x and x+ δ · d (δ > 0) as an
approximation for H · d.
Furthermore, we use u produced by this approximation method as a direction for initialization instead of the perturbation r
itself. The motivation behind this approach is to initialize PGD’s first-order iterations to a point with high curvature, so that
gradients and loss can increase rapidly (Sec 3.3). Since u is a unit vector in L2 norm, we use  · u as initialization for PGD
in L2 norm, and clip(
√
dx
pi ·  · u, min = −, max = ) for L∞ norm where dx is the dimension of input samples.
Note that this method requires back-propagation twice when approximating H · d using finite difference method.
Quasi-Newton method (PGD + BFGS) BFGS (BroydenFletcherGoldfarbShanno algorithm) is a second-order optimization
method that approximates the Quasi-Newton direction for update H−1 · g. Since we are only interested in the direction for
initialization, rather than fully iterate with second-order method, we only consider approximating the inverse of the Hessian
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Table B.2. Adversarial accuracy (in %) for different attack types compensated for the zero loss phenomenon. We sweep a constant T for
rescaling logits, and target labels t for changing loss computation; ‘random’ sets t to be randomly sampled among all possible classes,
‘least’ and ‘second’ indicate the least-likely and the second most-likely classes, respectively. We also state the gap between baseline and
compensated adversarial accuracy.
Rescaling TargetedEvaluation type Baseline
T = 10 T = 50 T = 100 Random Least Second Gap
Clean 84.75 - - - - - - -
FGSM 19.50 13.77 15.24 15.38 14.59 17.62 10.79 8.71
R-FGSM 29.81 30.35 30.44 30.46 30.02 30.73 29.11 0.70L∞,  = 4255
PGD 2.55 2.06 2.26 2.26 2.03 2.67 1.68 0.87
FGSM 14.04 3.51 4.40 4.51 4.20 6.52 3.08 10.96
R-FGSM 15.03 9.58 11.29 11.50 11.12 13.78 7.23 7.80L∞,  = 8255
PGD 0.24 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 0.24
FGM 23.18 20.45 21.46 21.54 20.77 22.67 18.10 5.08
R-FGM 39.64 40.09 40.23 40.26 39.81 40.33 39.08 0.56L2,  = 0.5
PGD 6.67 5.06 5.68 5.75 5.25 6.85 3.83 2.84
FGM 17.75 7.75 9.37 9.56 9.03 12.32 6.14 11.61
R-FGM 19.84 17.88 18.96 19.04 18.36 20.32 15.24 4.60L2,  = 1.0
PGD 3.82 0.11 0.28 0.28 0.25 1.39 0.03 3.79
H−1 and omit line search to obtain step size. We use a single update for H−1:
∆g =
∂l(f(x′), t)
∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x+d
− ∂l(f(x
′), t)
∂x′
∣∣∣
x′=x
(B.1)
H−1 = (I − d∆
T
g
∆Tg d
)(I − ∆gd
T
∆Tg d
) +
ddT
∆Tg d
(B.2)
where d is randomly sampled from N (0, I) and scaled to have a small size δ. Note that the update in Eq (B.2) is same
as typical BFGS inverse update for the first iteration where H−10 is initialized as the identity matrix. Then, we use
H−1 · g = H−1 · ∂l(f(x),t)∂x as the direction for initialization.
Similar to PGD + Eigen, this method requires two additional back-propagations for computing ∆g. However, this method
consumes more memory as it directly computes H−1 instead of the matrix-vector product H · d. Since H−1 is a dx × dx
matrix, batch size might have to be reduced to accommodate significant additional memory of H−1.
C. Additional experiments on case studies
Accuracy against compensated attacks is measured in a cascading manner, in which samples that survived the previous stage
(i.e., an attack fails on that sample to find adversarial perturbation) are subjected to the next compensation method. For a
single-step attack, such as FGSM or R-FGSM, we cascade compensation methods in following steps:
1. Apply an attack without any compensation methods.
2. Apply a compensation method for the zero loss phenomenon (default: change target labels to the second most likely
classes)
3. Apply a compensation method for the non-differentiability phenomenon (default: BPDA with softplus as a substitute
for ReLU and Lp norm pooling with p = 5 for max pooling)
4. Apply both compensation methods in 2 and 3 together
This scheme results in 4 effective evaluations, and baseline attacks with stochasticity (e.g. R-FGSM) are set to have 4
random starts (i.e., a sample has to survive all four attempts to be considered accurate; in other words, this is equivalent to 4
cascading attacks but without compensation methods) for fair comparison. For iterative attacks, such as PGD, we cascade as:
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Table B.3. The gap in adversarial accuracy (in %) when compensating for the zero loss phenomenon by changing target labels to be
the second most likely classes. ‘No Reg’ represents a Simple model with width scale factor of 4 trained without explicit regularization.
‘Weight Decay’ represents the same model as ‘No Reg’, but trained with weight decay of 5× 10−4. ‘Width x4’ represents a model with 4
times more neurons per layer compared to ‘No Reg’, thus is a Simple model with width scale factor of 16. ‘Batch Norm’ indicates a
Simple-BN model, which is same as ‘No Reg’ except for batch normalization following each convolutional layer.
Evaluation type No Reg Weight Decay Width x4 Batch Norm
L∞,  = 4255
FGSM 8.71 4.48 19.48 18.73
R-FGSM 0.70 0.59 5.78 9.36
PGD 0.87 0.19 4.51 6.16
L∞,  = 8255
FGSM 10.96 8.12 18.43 19.99
R-FGSM 7.80 3.89 17.75 15.68
PGD 0.24 0.15 1.20 2.05
L2,  = 0.5
FGM 5.08 2.41 16.54 16.78
R-FGM 0.56 0.63 2.72 5.64
PGD 2.84 0.57 15.29 12.68
L2,  = 1.0
FGM 11.61 7.91 27.34 21.02
R-FGM 4.60 1.73 16.24 15.51
PGD 3.79 2.14 19.62 9.45
1. Apply an attack without any compensation methods (e.g., plain PGD).
2. Apply PGD with an initialization method proposed in Sec 3.3 (default: PGD + Eigen)
3. Apply a compensation method for the zero loss phenomenon with plain PGD (default: change target labels to the
second most likely classes)
4. Apply both compensation methods in 2 and 3 together
5. Apply a compensation method for the non-differentiability phenomenon along with compensation methods in 2 and 3
(default: BPDA with softplus as a substitute for ReLU and Lp norm pooling with p = 5 for max pooling)
Note that for iterative attacks, we do not test for every possible combination of compensation methods for the three
phenomena. Resulting scheme has 5 effective evaluations, and baseline attacks are set to have 5 random starts. For PGD
attacks in subsequent experiments, we use total 9 back-propagations (9 iterations without initialization methods of Sec 3.3
or 7 iterations with those initialization methods) as a default value. When a compensation method is not effective for a given
model, just using another random start can be more effective than using that compensation method. In such case, accuracy
against baseline attacks can be lower than accuracy against compensated attacks.
C.1. Training models with different width
In this section, we present additional results on benchmarking the trade-off between adversarial accuracy and model widths.
Details of training hyperparameters for models used in this section are described in Table C.1.
Additional figures for CIFAR-10 dataset We measure how accuracy difference among Simple models with different width
is affected by the perturbation size  of attacks (Fig C.1 (a, b)). For both FG(S)M and PGD attacks, we observe that attacks
with larger  are affected more by compensation methods; in other words, accuracy against attacks with larger  tends to be
more overestimated for Simple models and CIFAR-10 dataset we consider in this example.
We also measure adversarial accuracy for other architectures, Simple-BN models (Fig C.1 (c)) and WRN 28 models (Fig
C.1 (d)). Similar to Simple models, the difference in adversarial accuracy between models with small and large widths is
overestimated, and that difference reduces when compensation methods are applied.
SVHN For SVHN dataset, we consider Simple-BN and WRN 28 models (same architectures as those for CIFAR-10 dataset)
(Fig C.2). In contrast to models trained on CIFAR-10, models trained on SVHN show less accuracy difference even for
baseline attacks. Interestingly, adversarial accuracy of larger models often drops (e.g. accuracy against FGSM attacks for
Simple-BN with width=16), and compensating can increase accuracy difference between small and large models in such
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Table B.4. Adversarial accuracy (in %) of a Simple model, same as in Table B.2, for different attack types compensated for innate
non-differentiability using BPDA. We investigate three differentiable functions for substituting ReLU: Softplus (α = 2, thresholded at 2),
CELU (α = 2), and ELU (α = 1) while fixing Lp-norm pool’s p to be 5. Then, we sweep for p by fixing ReLU substitute function to be
the one achieved the best performance.
ReLU Substitute Lp-norm PoolEvaluation Type Baseline Softplus CELU ELU p = 2 p = 5 p = 10 Gap
Clean 84.75 - - - - - - -
FGSM 19.50 18.41 18.93 18.68 18.58 18.41 18.44 1.09
R-FGSM 29.81 29.17 30.51 29.92 30.26 29.17 29.15 0.66L∞,  = 4255
PGD 2.55 2.54 2.54 2.50 2.57 2.50 2.47 0.08
FGSM 14.04 12.33 12.06 12.15 11.85 12.06 12.11 2.19
R-FGSM 15.03 14.88 14.95 14.72 15.03 14.72 14.78 0.31L∞,  = 8255
PGD 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.11
FGM 23.18 21.07 22.43 22.22 21.66 21.07 20.59 2.59
R-FGM 39.64 38.85 40.05 39.72 39.77 38.85 35.67 3.97L2,  = 0.5
PGD 6.67 6.68 6.57 6.55 6.56 6.55 6.64 0.12
FGM 17.75 16.07 16.04 16.25 15.87 16.04 15.78 1.97
R-FGM 19.84 18.69 19.66 19.39 19.06 18.69 17.98 1.86L2,  = 1.0
PGD 3.82 3.90 3.64 3.63 3.58 3.63 3.67 0.24
case. Nevertheless, general magnitude of accuracy difference between small and large models is moderate (∼ 6%) compared
to that for models trained on CIFAR-10 (∼ 25%). Results on SVHN indicate that even the same architectures and training
conditions can show different behaviors depending on datasets.
TinyImageNet We consider VGG 11, VGG-BN 11, and WRN 50 models with different relative widths for TinyImageNet
(Fig C.3). VGG 11 and VGG-BN 11 models show similar pattern as models trained on CIFAR-10; adversarial accuracy
of models with larger widths is overestimated, resulting in large accuracy difference between models for baseline attacks.
However, behavior of WRN 50 models is more similar to that of models trained on SVHN, in that there is not significant
difference in accuracy among models with different width.
C.2. Weight pruning
For weight pruning, we initially train a WRN 28 model with width scale factor of 10. The model is trained for 100 epochs
using SGD with momentum of 0.9 as an optimizer, with starting learning rate of 0.1, which is decayed by factor of 10 every
40 epochs. We use early stopping based on the validation accuracy. Batch size is fixed to 128. To compare the impact
of using weight decay, we train two models with and without weight decay of 5 × 10−4 with otherwise same training
conditions as stated.
We iteratively remove weights with small magnitude as in typical weight pruning. To be specific, in each pruning iteration,
we remove 25% of total weights from convolution layers based on their magnitude, and finetune for 10 epochs with learning
rate of 0.001. Otherwise, finetuning conditions are same as training conditions. However, note that the optimizer is initialized
at each pruning iteration so that the momentum term from previous iteration (which contains information on removed
weights) does not affect current finetuning. We iterate this process for 9 cycles, and the proportion of surviving weights at
the final stage is 7.5%.
C.3. Regularization
Regularization techniques are developed for better generalization, as for weight decay and spectral normalization (Miyato
et al., 2018), or robustness against perturbations, as for orthonormal regularization (Cisse et al., 2017), Jacobian regularization
(Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2017; Jakubovitz & Giryes, 2018), and adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al.,
2017). In this section, we present these techniques in detail, and provide additional experimental results.
Rethinking Empirical Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness Using First-Order Attack Methods
Table B.5. Adversarial accuracy (in %) of a WRN 28 (width scale factor: 2), trained on CIFAR-10 without explicit regularization,
compensated for innate non-differentiability using BPDA. Details are same as in Table B.4, except for that this model does not use max
pooling.
ReLU SubstituteEvaluation Type Baseline Softplus CELU ELU Gap
Clean 91.65 - - - -
FGSM 21.90 15.87 21.36 20.06 6.03
R-FGSM 20.79 19.76 23.71 23.30 1.03L∞,  = 4255
PGD 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00
FGSM 17.57 10.93 15.38 13.83 6.64
R-FGSM 5.41 4.43 7.28 6.50 0.98L∞,  = 8255
PGD 0 - - - -
FGM 47.30 44.73 45.46 42.76 4.54
R-FGM 45.13 44.11 46.87 45.29 1.02L2,  = 0.5
PGD 22.58 21.92 18.15 15.78 6.80
FGM 45.33 42.57 40.75 38.26 7.07
R-FGM 36.18 35.89 37.05 33.78 2.40L2,  = 1.0
PGD 16.29 15.81 11.09 11.95 5.20
C.3.1. DETAILS ON REGULARIZATION METHODS
Weight decay penalizes the Frobenius norm of weight matrices, inducing weights to be smaller. Typically, weight decay is
directly incorporated to optimizers. However, when written as an additional regularization term to loss function, weight
decay can be expressed as:
l′(f, x, t) = l(f(x), t) + λ
L∑
i=1
‖Wi‖2F (C.1)
where f is a deep neural network model with total L layers, x is an input sample, and t is the ground truth label. l(·, ·) is a
standard cross-entropy loss, and λ controls the strength of weight decay term. In this work, we consider fixed λ throughout
training process and increasing λ as training progresses to excessively apply weight decay. Wi represents a weight matrix of
the ith layer. Typically, we use λ = 5× 10−4 for fixed weight decay, and start with λ = 1× 10−4 and multiply it by factor
of 10 every 40 epochs for excessive weight decay. We choose to increase λ instead of using large fixed λ to study excessive
weight decay, because larger λ (e.g. 10−2) at earlier epochs resulted in poor training that often did not escape starting loss
and accuracy level.
Spectral normalization (Miyato et al., 2018) was proposed to set the Lipschitz constant of each layer to be 1, by dividing
weights of each layer with the estimated largest eigenvalue of that layer, so that training can be stabilized especially for
Generative Adversarial Networks. For a weight matrix Wi corresponding to the ith layer, Miyato et al. (2018) computed the
largest singular value of this layer σ(Wi) using a single-step power iteration per a single forward-backward pass during
training, then divide the weight matrix by σ(Wi) to set the large singular value to be 1. We use spectral normalization
layer after each convolution and linear layer (except for the final linear classifier), and remove batch normalization if it is
originally used. Also, we do not use spectral normalization for convolution layers used for residual connections in WRN 28.
Orthonormal regularization was used as a part of Parseval network (Cisse et al., 2017) that improved adversarial robustness
of deep neural networks. In particular, orthonormal regularization induces each weight matrix to be orthonormal, so that the
eigenvalues of WTi Wi become 1. The motivation behind this is similar to that of spectral normalization, in that both aim to
control the Lipschitz constant of each layer. The resulting loss function to be optimized is:
l′(f, x, t) = l(f(x), t) + λ
L∑
i=1
‖WTi Wi − I‖2F (C.2)
where I is an identity matrix with the same size as WTi Wi. Note that this formulation is simplified from what Cisse
et al. (2017) used in their work, which included sampling and other regularization for convexity. We follow orthonormal
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Table B.6. Adversarial accuracy (in %) of a Simple model, same as in Table B.4, when compensated for both zero loss and innate
non-differentiability. The zero-loss phenomenon is compensated by changing the targe labels to be the second most likely classes.
ReLU Substitute Lp-norm PoolEvaluation Type Zero Loss Only Softplus CELU ELU p = 2 p = 5 p = 10 Gap
Clean 84.75 - - - - - - -
FGSM 10.79 8.74 10.05 9.45 9.40 8.74 8.86 2.23
R-FGSM 29.11 28.31 29.78 29.11 29.45 28.31 28.39 0.80L∞,  = 4255
PGD 1.68 1.70 1.73 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 -0.02
FGSM 3.08 1.25 1.62 1.56 1.13 1.25 1.43 1.95
R-FGSM 7.23 6.25 7.17 6.47 6.64 6.25 6.28 0.98L∞,  = 8255
PGD 0 - - - - - - -
FGM 18.10 14.94 17.01 16.56 15.94 14.94 13.74 4.36
R-FGM 39.08 38.29 39.47 39.10 39.26 38.29 34.33 4.75L2,  = 0.5
PGD 3.83 3.90 3.90 3.88 3.93 3.88 3.91 -0.05
FGM 6.14 3.11 4.47 4.41 3.15 3.11 3.08 3.06
R-FGM 15.24 13.16 14.95 14.48 13.90 13.16 12.16 3.08L2,  = 1.0
PGD 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00
Table B.7. Adversarial accuracy (in %) of a WRN 28, same as in Table B.5, compensated for both zero loss and innate nondifferentiability.
ReLU SubstituteEvaluation Type Zero Loss Only Softplus CELU ELU Gap
Clean 91.65 - - - -
FGSM 11.34 5.94 11.08 10.58 5.40
R-FGSM 13.46 11.25 15.21 15.01 2.21L∞,  = 4255
PGD 0 - - - -
FGSM 7.89 3.36 6.87 6.01 4.53
R-FGSM 2.49 1.3 3.55 3.27 1.19L∞,  = 8255
PGD 0 - - - -
FGM 21.32 11.72 21.1 20.49 9.60
R-FGM 27.74 21.93 30.15 29.4 5.81L2,  = 0.5
PGD 0 - - - -
FGM 15.55 7.3 14.59 13.62 8.25
R-FGM 12.51 7.73 14.91 14.39 4.78L2,  = 1.0
PGD 0 - - - -
regularization used as in Lin et al. (2019) that adopted this simple formulation for convolution layers to improve adversarial
robustness of models with activation quantization.
Jacobian regularization (Jakubovitz & Giryes, 2018) or input gradient regularization (Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2017) can be
thought as reducing the first-order term in Taylor’s expansion when a small perturbation r is added to an input x:
l(f(x+ r), t) ' l(f(x), t) + rT · ∇xl(f(x), t) +O(‖r‖2) (C.3)
Jacobian regularization computes gradients for every logit zi (where z = f(x)) with respect to the input x, and the resulting
loss function is:
l′(f, x, t) = l(f(x), t) + λ
√√√√ C∑
i=1
dx∑
j=1
(
∂zi
∂xj
)2 (C.4)
This method can require significant additional back-propagations when the total number of classes C is large, as in the case
of TinyImageNet with 200 classes. More simply, input gradient regularization computes Jacobian not from logits z, but
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Table C.1. Training hyperparamters of models used in Appendix C.1.
Dataset Architecture Training condition
CIFAR-10,
SVHN
Simple
Epochs: 100, Batch size: 128
Optimizer: SGD with momentum of 0.9
Learning rate: start with 0.01, decay by factor of 10 every 40 epochs
Regularization: fixed weight decay of 5× 10−4
Simple-BN,
WRN 28
Epochs: 100, Batch size: 128
Optimizer: SGD with momentum of 0.9
Learning rate: start with 0.1, decay by factor of 10 every 40 epochs
Regularization: fixed weight decay of 5× 10−4
TinyImageNet
VGG 11
Epochs: 100, Batch size: 128 (96 for scale factor 4)
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99)
Learning rate: start with 10−4. decay by factor of 10 every 40 epochs
Regularization: none
VGG-BN 11
Epochs: 100, Batch size: 128 (96 for scale factor 4)
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99)
Learning rate: start with 10−3. decay by factor of 10 every 40 epochs
Regularization: none
WRN 50
Epochs: 100, Batch size: 128
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99)
Learning rate: start with 10−3. decay by factor of 10 every 40 epochs
Regularization: fixed weight decay of 5× 10−4
from loss directly:
l′(f, x, t) = l(f(x), t) + λ
dx∑
j=1
(
∂l(f(x), t)
∂xj
)2 (C.5)
In this work, we consider the later form of input gradient regularization. For more details including theoretical justification
of Jacobian regularization in relation to Lipschitz stability, we refer readers to Jakubovitz & Giryes (2018).
Adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017) achieved robustness by directly train a model on samples
crafted by attack methods. Madry et al. (2017) analyzed that adversarial training can be thought as an optimization for
min-max problem when a model f is parameterized with θ:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
l(fθ(xadv), t) = arg min
θ
max
x′
l(fθ(x
′), t) (C.6)
and that attack methods, such as PGD, are approximation for the inner maximization.
C.3.2. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the result presented in Section 4.2, we show how adversarial accuracy of regularization techniques is affected
by the three phenomena, for different architectures and datasets. Details of training conditions for models used in this
section are shown in Table C.2.
First, we present more detailed results for WRN 28 models trained on CIFAR-10 using different regularization techniques
in Table C.3. We measure adversarial accuracy against both baseline and compensated attacks for different perturbation
sizes  in L∞ and L2 norm. Generally, adversarial accuracy against smaller perturbation  tends to be less affected by
compensation methods, manifested by relatively small gap between baseline and compensated adversarial accuracy for
 = 2255 for L∞ norm and  = 0.3 for L2 norm.
Then, we consider different architectures, Simple and Simple-BN, for CIFAR-10 dataset (Table C.4). We observe that
spectral normalization and orthonormal regularization are less affected by compensation methods for these architectures,
in contrast to WRN 28 architecture. For example, adversarial accuracy (PGD,  = 4255 ) of a WRN 28 with spectral
normalization decreases by 5.25% when compensation methods are applied, but that for a Simple model only decreases by
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Figure C.1. (a, b) Accuracy difference (with respect to the accuracy of the model with width=1) of Simple models with different relative
widths, measured for different perturbation sizes  in L2 norm using a single-step FG(S)M attack (a) and an iterative PGD attack (b). (c,
d) Accuracy difference (with respect to the accuracy of the model with width=1 for Simple-BN and width=2 for WRN 28) of Simple-BN
models (c) and WRN 28 models (d) with different relative widths. For all plots, dashed and solid lines represent accuracy against baseline
and compensated attacks, respectively.
0.02%. For a Simple model with orthonormal regularization, compensation methods with PGD turn out to be not effective
and result in even higher adversarial accuracy compared to baseline PGD. Therefore, the effectiveness of regularization
methods, especially whether they rely on the three phenomena inflating adversarial accuracy, might be dependent on model
architectures.
Finally, we run similar experiments for different datasets, SVHN (Table C.5) and TinyImageNet (Table C.6). Models trained
on SVHN generally show much less gap between adversarial accuracy against baseline and compensated attacks compared
to those trained on CIFAR-10, even when architectures are exactly same for both SVHN and CIFAR-10. Also, adversarial
accuracy of models using weight decay and spectral normalization is affected less severely by compensation methods for
SVHN. WRN 50 models trained on TinyImageNet are benchmarked for limited regularizaton techniques. In contrast to
CIFAR-10 and SVHN, Jacobian regularization seems to be affected by compensation methods by 6% of accuracy difference
against a PGD attack. Overall, these observations imply that whether adversarial accuracy of regularizaton techniques is
overestimated can be complicated by model architectures and datasets.
D. Additional experiments on transferability
We experiment on how compensation methods affect black-box adversarial accuracy, where we craft adversarial examples
from a surrogate model without accessing parameters of a target model. Gap between adversarial accuracy against baseline
and compensated attacks can indicate whether black-box adversarial accuracy is overestimated originally. We measure
black-box transferability of adversarial examples generated using compensation methods among Simple models with
different relative width (Table D.1), WRN 28 models with different regularization techniques (Table D.2), and different
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Figure C.2. Accuracy difference (with respect to the accuracy of the model with width=1 for Simple-BN and width=2 for WRN 28) of
Simple-BN models (a) and WRN 28 models (b) trained on SVHN with different relative widths. Dashed and solid lines represent accuracy
against baseline and compensated attacks, respectively.
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Figure C.3. Accuracy difference (with respect to the model with width=1) of VGG 11 models (a), VGG-BN 11 models (b), and WRN
50 models (c) trained on TinyImageNet with different relative widths. Dashed and solid lines represent accuracy against baseline and
compensated attacks, respectively.
architectures for CIFAR-10 dataset (Table D.3). Note that we rescale logits (T = 10) to compensate for the zero loss
phenomenon, instead of changing target labels, as mentioned in Section 6.
E. Experimental details on verified lower bounds
Here we elaborate on experimental setup for Section 6. We introduce each model considered, and methods to obtain the lower
bound of each model. We follow data preprocessing of Wong & Kolter (2017) for MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset, which
additionally includes normalization in case of CIFAR-10; the size of perturbation  is scaled according to the normalization
so that the pixel level perturbation size (which assumes 0-255 RGB image encoded with 8-bit) can be preserved.
• MNIST-A,  = 0.4 : this model uses ‘small’ model of Wong & Kolter (LPd-CNNA
of Tjeng et al.), and is trained with the code publicly available made by Wong & Kolter
(https://github.com/locuslab/convex adversarial). Training hyperparameters are:
cascade=1, epochs=200, schedule length=20, norm type=l1 median, norm eval=l1,
starting epsilon=0.01, verbose=200, batch size=20, test batch size=10, eps=0.4.
To obtain the lower bound of this model, we use verification method with MILP, with publicly available code provided
by Tjeng et al. (https://github.com/vtjeng/MIPVerify.jl). We measure for untargeted adversarial
robustness with  = 0.4 in L∞ norm, and find that MILP can provide exact robustness (that is, there is no gap between
upper and lower bounds obtained by MILP) for this model.
• MNIST-B,  = 0.3 : this model is ‘large’ model of Wong & Kolter (LPd-CNNB of Tjeng et al.), and is
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directly obtained from repository of Wong & Kolter (‘mnist large 0 3.pth’). The lower bound of ro-
bustness is directly taken from Tjeng et al.; because they measure lower and upper bounds of error, we take
100%− upper bound of error from Tjeng et al. as the lower bound of robustness.
• CIFAR-A,  = 2255 : this model is ‘small’ model for CIFAR-10 of Wong & Kolter (LPd-CNNA of Tjeng et al.), and
is directly obtained from repository of Wong & Kolter (‘cifar small 2px.pth’). The lower bound of robustness
is directly taken from Tjeng et al., as MNIST-B.
• CIFAR-B,  = 8255 : this model is ‘ResNet’ model for CIFAR-10 of Wong & Kolter (LPd-RES of Tjeng et al.),
and is directly obtained from repository of Wong & Kolter (‘cifar resnet 8px.pth’). The lower bound of
robustness is directly taken from Tjeng et al., as MNIST-B.
Adversarial accuracy is measured using a PGD attack with stated  for each model in L∞ norm. Baseline attacks use 5
random starts to have the same number of evaluations as compensated attacks.
F. C&W attack and zero loss
In this section, we analyze how C&W attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) can be affected by the zero loss phenomenon
depending on the choice of the objective function. Carlini & Wagner proposed 7 different objective functions that are
minimized only when the prediction is wrong. The default choice among them, which gives high success rate with small
perturbation size, directly operates on pre-softmax logits z:
gobj(x, t) = max{−max{zi; i 6= t}+ zt,−κ} (F.1)
where κ can act as a confidence parameter. When we use this objective function along with another objective to minimize
the perturbation size in L2 norm for C&W attack, we obtain 100% success rate for two Simple models (width=4) trained on
CIFAR-10 with and without weight decay of 5× 10−4. The average distortion sizes for two models are 0.188 for the model
trained without weight decay (i.e., without any explicit regularization) and 0.214 for the model trained with weight decay.
However, when we choose the objective function that operates on softmaxed logits softmax(z) or cross-entropy loss
l(z, t), for example,
gobj(x, t) = 1− l(f(x), t) (F.2)
we observe that the success rate of C&W attack drops to 88.62% for the model trained without explicit regularization,
and 93.41% for the model trained with weight decay. Samples on which this C&W attack fails have zero cross-entropy
loss, thus computing gradients for gobj does not produce meaningful optimization direction, similar as in the zero loss
phenomenon for bounded first-order attack methods discussed in Section 3.1. Although we do not examine unbounded
attack methods, such as C&W attack discussed here, this analysis shows that unbounded attack methods can suffer from
the zero loss phenomenon when the objective function for optimization is not carefully chosen. Objective functions that
directly operate on pre-softmax logits, as in the default case for C&W attack, are preferrable as logits mostly vary linearly,
as opposed to loss value that can vary exponentially.
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Table C.2. Training hyperparameters of models used in Appendix C.3
Dataset Architecture Regularization(λ if applicable) Other training conditions
CIFAR-10
Simple
(width=4)
None
Epochs: 100,
Batch size: 128,
Optimizer: SGD (momentum=0.9),
Learning rate: start with 0.01, decay by 10 / 40 epochs
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Spectral normalization
Orthonormal, λ = 1× 10−4
Input gradient, λ = 1.0
Adversarial training,
for L∞ norm:  = 8255 , 7 iterations
for L2 norm:  = 1.0, 7 iterations
Apply fixed weight decay of λ = 5× 10−4
Simple-BN
(width=4)
None
Learning rate: start with 0.1
Otherwise same as above
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Orthonormal, λ = 1× 10−3
Input gradient, λ = 1.0
Adversarial training,
for L∞ norm:  = 8255 , 7 iterations
for L2 norm:  = 1.0, 7 iterations
Apply fixed weight decay of λ = 5× 10−4
WRN 28
(width=2)
None
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Spectral normalization
Orthonormal, λ = 1× 10−3
Input gradient, λ = 1.0
Adversarial training,
for L∞ norm:  = 8255 , 7 iterations
for L2 norm:  = 1.0, 7 iterations
Apply fixed weight decay of λ = 5× 10−4
SVHN
Simple-BN
(width=4)
None Epochs: 100,
Batch size: 128,
Optimizer: SGD (momentum=0.9),
Learning rate: start with 0.1, decay by 10 / 40 epochs
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Spectral normalization
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99)
Learning rate: start with 10−4
Otherwise same as above.
Orthonormal, λ = 1× 10−3 Same as those for ‘None’ (see above)Input gradient, λ = 1.0
Adversarial training,
for L∞ norm:  = 8255 , 7 iterations
for L2 norm:  = 1.0, 7 iterations
Apply fixed weight decay of λ = 5× 10−4
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.5)
Learning rate: start with 10−3
Otherwise same as above.
WRN 28
(width=2)
None
Epochs: 100,
Batch size: 128,
Optimizer: SGD (momentum=0.9),
Learning rate: start with 0.1, decay by 10 / 40 epochs
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Spectral normalization
Orthonormal, λ = 1× 10−3
Input gradient, λ = 1.0
Adversarial training,
for L∞ norm:  = 8255 , 7 iterations
for L2 norm:  = 1.0, 7 iterations
Apply fixed weight decay of λ = 5× 10−4
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.9)
Learning rate: start with 10−3
Otherwise same as above.
TinyImageNet WRN 50(width=1)
None Epochs: 100,
Batch size: 128,
Optimizer: Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99),
Learning rate: start with 0.1, decay by 10 / 40 epochs
Weight decay, λ = 5× 10−4
Weight decay excess
Input gradient, λ = 0.01 Batch size: 64
Otherwise same as above.Input gradient, λ = 0.05
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Table C.4. Accuracy of Simple and Simple-BN models trained on CIFAR-10 using different regularization techniques against baseline
and compensated attack methods, in the order of FGSM/R-FGSM/PGD with  = 4
255
in L∞ norm. Note that spectral normalization for
Simple-BN is same as that for Simple, as spectral normalization layer is used instead of batch normalization layer.
Regularization Simple Simple-BN
Clean Baseline Compensated Clean Baseline Compensated
None 84.75 19.50 / 30.78 / 2.55 8.74 / 28.31 / 1.58 87.09 28.66 / 29.81 / 6.26 6.89 / 17.93 / 0.07
Weight decay 85.06 17.74 / 35.30 / 3.40 11.08 / 33.35 / 3.08 89.84 13.62 / 18.32 / 0.13 4.69 / 15.15 / 0.01
Weight decay excess 84.92 15.14 / 36.30 / 3.29 11.64 / 34.22 / 3.20 87.58 6.10 / 16.80 / 0.03 4.90 / 15.33 / 0.03
Spectral norm 81.47 22.33 / 47.20 / 13.32 20.29 / 45.96 / 13.20 - - -
Orthonormal 84.82 16.38 / 39.05 / 5.12 12.89 / 37.01 / 5.21 88.59 9.53 / 18.92 / 0.07 4.05 / 16.25 / 0.06
Input gradient 84.26 24.98 / 50.24 / 14.91 22.81 / 48.86 / 14.84 84.67 26.74 / 50.98 / 15.02 23.71 / 49.68 / 15.00
Adv training 67.04 54.14 / 60.61 / 53.48 52.95 / 60.05 / 52.19 70.91 57.40 / 64.07 / 56.48 56.36 / 63.54 / 55.43
Table C.5. Accuracy of Simple-BN and WRN 28 models trained on SVHN using different regularization techniques against baseline and
compensated attack methods, in the order of FGSM/R-FGSM/PGD with  = 4
255
in L∞ norm.
Regularization Simple-BN WRN 28
Clean Baseline Compensated Clean Baseline Compensated
None 94.29 28.60 / 45.39 / 2.80 19.10 / 41.31 / 2.38 95.42 49.74 / 60.31 / 4.06 34.30 / 55.05 / 3.65
Weight decay 95.37 28.06 / 51.61 / 4.57 23.90 / 49.64 / 4.64 96.38 63.99 / 70.25 / 8.71 56.25 / 68.12 / 7.31
Weight decay excess 92.85 26.76 / 51.31 / 6.51 22.56 / 49.19 / 6.33 95.03 57.56 / 66.51 / 13.86 51.95 / 64.31 / 12.14
Spectral norm 88.26 32.83 / 59.93 / 22.83 29.45 / 57.95 / 22.50 94.63 40.91 / 63.94 / 22.05 37.03 / 61.84 / 21.97
Orthonormal 94.89 24.37 / 46.15 / 1.72 15.24 / 40.82 / 1.66 96.25 56.78 / 65.28 / 5.78 39.59 / 59.80 / 4.87
Input gradient 91.43 39.50 / 65.73 / 25.52 34.64 / 63.38 / 24.99 95.45 50.22 / 76.16 / 35.49 46.49 / 74.80 / 35.13
Adv training 83.75 66.63 / 74.87 / 63.41 64.07 / 74.34 / 61.95 91.91 78.27 / 85.15 / 75.58 76.16 / 84.76 / 74.47
Table C.6. Accuracy of WRN 50 models trained on TinyImageNet using different regularization techniques against baseline and compen-
sated attack methods, in the order of FGSM/R-FGSM/PGD with  = 2
255
in L∞ norm.
Regularization Clean Baseline Compensated
None 57.24 24.38 / 27.90 / 8.50 10.40 / 23.76 / 5.30
Weight decay 55.22 5.80 / 14.22 / 0.68 4.68 / 13.30 / 0.64
Weight decay excess 57.54 9.56 / 19.88 / 2.06 7.04 / 17.64 / 1.84
Input gradient (λ = 0.01) 53.70 24.66 / 27.96 / 12.94 10.76 / 24.88 / 6.68
Input gradient (λ = 0.05) 55.58 24.56 / 28.62 / 14.52 12.50 / 26.94 / 8.66
Table D.1. Adversarial accuracy of Simple models with different relative width trained on CIFAR-10 (with fixed weight decay of 5×10−4)
under the black-box setting, where we craft adversarial examples using the source model. We use a PGD attack with  = 4
255
in L∞ norm,
and state adversarial accuracy against baseline (before arrow) and targeted (after arrow) attacks. Labels of rows and columns indicate
relative width.
Source
Target 1 2 4 8 16
1 - 51.80→ 46.05 61.55→ 56.30 64.33→ 59.29 62.82→ 57.11
2 40.12→ 34.67 - 48.55→ 42.28 50.23→ 44.17 50.49→ 44.26
4 39.83→ 35.55 37.23→ 32.51 - 38.59→ 33.48 39.29→ 34.42
8 38.15→ 33.40 33.24→ 29.04 32.62→ 28.33 - 28.70→ 25.26
16 32.33→ 27.36 30.89→ 26.55 30.08→ 26.26 25.60→ 22.53 -
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Table D.2. Adversarial accuracy of WRN 28 models with different regularization techniques trained on CIFAR-10 under the black-box
setting, where adversarial examples are crafted using the source model as a surrogate. These models are independently trained under their
own training conditions, but are identically initialized. We use the same attack method as in Table D.1
Source
Target None Weight decay Weight decay excess Spectral Orthonormal Input gradient Adv train
None 22.57→ 9.54 19.28→ 7.92 77.51→ 74.78 28.04→ 13.99 80.28→ 75.61 81.34→ 81.12
Weight decay 25.37→ 19.57 23.72→ 18.69 79.94→ 76.40 25.61→ 19.58 82.73→ 78.36 81.49→ 80.87
Weight decay excess 36.27→ 29.17 39.17→ 30.34 81.56→ 79.29 45.89→ 35.75 84.66→ 81.55 81.68→ 81.08
Spectral 59.91→ 56.33 68.59→ 66.03 65.34→ 62.75 70.20→ 68.18 72.95→ 70.76 80.40→ 79.89
Orthonormal 26.85→ 12.26 21.04→ 7.72 26.64→ 11.86 79.97→ 77.96 82.43→ 79.11 81.53→ 81.16
Input gradient 26.21→ 24.03 33.59→ 31.31 32.73→ 30.16 52.61→ 48.71 36.90→ 34.40 79.41→ 78.47
Adv train 82.54→ 81.34 86.25→ 85.55 83.46→ 82.40 76.84→ 75.04 86.07→ 85.24 80.34→ 79.53
Table D.3. Adversarial accuracy of models with different architectures that are trained on CIFAR-10 (with fixed weight decay of 5×10−4)
under the black-box setting. The Simple and Simple-BN models have width 4, and the WRN 28 model has width 2. Details of evaluation
is same as in Table D.1.
Source
Target Simple Simple-BN WRN 28
Simple 51.61→ 47.81 65.82→ 62.48
Simple-BN 69.34→ 66.19 37.96→ 31.28
WRN 28 78.54→ 74.23 62.15→ 45.60
